In this paper, I review recent trends in global integration of financial systems and assess the implications for international macroeconomic adjustment. While recent growth in the scale of international balance sheets has been dramatic, product markets remain quite segmented. The mis-match between financial and real integration means that the role of exchange rates in international adjustment has taken on an even more crucial role.
Introduction
A defining feature of recent international economic history has been the tremendous growth in cross-border financial trade. The "international balance sheets" of countries now look quite different relative to the situation in earlier periods, with the accumulation of large gross cross-holdings of foreign assets and foreign liabilities across a broad spectrum of investment categories. In this paper, I discuss the drivers of international financial integration and ask whether all barriers to asset trade have been eliminated. I next consider the macroeconomic implications of these trends. Finally, I analyse the interaction between financial globalisation and real globalisation, where the latter refers to the international integration of product markets.
Measuring International Financial Integration
There a number of different options in measuring the extent of financial globalisation.
One popular method has been to measure shifts over time in the the prevalence of capital controls (see Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti 1995 for an influential contribution). However, that approach does not indicate the extent to which cross-border asset trade actually takes place once legal prohibitions on international capital mobility are removed. Another route is to focus on price-based measures of integration: does arbitrage ensure that the prices of similar assets are equalised across locations? While useful, this route also does not reveal the extent of asset trade that occurs once barriers to arbitrage have been eliminated.
Rather, my research with Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti has focused on tracking volumebased measures of international financial integration. The volume of international asset holdings plays a central role in international macroeconomic models, since the scale of international balance sheets largely determines the scope for risk sharing and influences the international transmission of financial shocks. Until recently, a problem in pursuing volumebased measures has been a lack of data on the value of international investment positions.
While much was known about international capital flows, the dynamics of investment holdings also heavily depend on revaluation effects: for instance, a large capital loss on a given foreign asset holding may vastly outweigh new flows in that asset class.
The situation has improved markedly in recent years: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a) employed a variety of valuation techniques to assemble data on stocks of foreign assets and liabilities for 67 countries over 1970-1997, while there has also been a greater effort to improve the official statistics on international investment positions. (However, the latter typically only covers the most recent years, rather than providing a long time series of data.) Moreover, in addition to measuring the aggregate positions, the work of Milesi-Ferretti (2001a, 2001b) has also highlighted the importance of the composition of the international balance sheet. For instance, the potential for international risk sharing is sensitive to the debt-equity mix in terms of the external capital structure of nations.
These new data sources highlight that there has been a trend increase in international financial integration since the early 1980s.
1 An important feature of the data is that this trend has accelerated since the mid-1990s: the pace of financial globalization has increased over the last decade. For a group of industrial countries over 1983 -2001 , Lane and MilesiFerretti (2003 seek to identify the drivers of international financial integration by running a panel regression of the form
where IF IGDP it is the ratio of the sum of gross foreign assets and gross foreign liabilities to GDP and X it , Z it are a set of country-and time-varying determinants.
2 Their results highlight that domestic and international financial deepening are highly complementary: a key driver of international asset trade has been the growth in domestic stockmarket capitalizations. In addition, growth in GDP per capita and the volume of product trade have also been associated with a faster pace of financial globalization. The latter result also underlines the tight connection between real and financial dimensions of global integration:
1 See also Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) for a longer-term perspective. we return to this point later in this paper. In summary, those industrial countries that are enjoying domestic financial deepening, faster output growth and expansion of international trade in goods and services are also those that are furthest ahead in terms of financial globalization.
With respect to the emerging market group of developing countries, financial globalization has also been taking place, albeit with some major fluctuations associated with the various crises of the 1990s. specification is
where EQ HS is the equity holdings by source country S in host country H, α H is a hostcountry fixed effect, α S is a source-country fixed effect and X HS is a set of bilateral variables that may influence portfolio allocations. It is important to include the fixed effect dummies for the source and host countries: otherwise, a high level of equity holdings by country S in country H may simply reflect that the source country invests heavily in all locations and/or the host country is a major recipient of international investment from all sources. In this setting, the bilateral variables X HS are included in order to explain why source country S may under-or over-weight host country H relative to other countries.
Their study highlights an important complementarity between trade integration and financial integration: a robust covariate of bilateral portfolio holdings is the bilateral volume of trade. In addition, informational proxies such as a common language and distance also turn out to be typically significant in explaining the bilateral variation in holdings. Holding fixed these variables, 'financial' factors such as the correlation in returns between markets do not appear to be significant. These results indicate that the theoretical simplification of a homogeneous global investor is quite misleading: investment patterns remain quite fragmented, in line with the presence of trade and informational frictions. The facilitation of non-zero long-term net foreign asset positions is one of the putative gains from international financial integration. Countries that wish to generate future investment income may naturally run current account surpluses, while countries that prefer current to future expenditure are enabled to run current account deficits. In addition to standard cyclical fluctuations, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a) show that the dynamics of net foreign asset positions can be fairly well explained by a parsimonious model in which the driving variables are relative output per capita, net public debt and demographic structures. According to their estimates, countries that are have lower output per capita, larger government debts and youth-biased demography are more likely to be long-term net debtors, while richer countries with lower public debt and an older population emerge as the corresponding group of net creditors.
However, increased dispersion in net foreign asset positions has implications for macroeconomic stability and external adjustment. Even if large net positions are perfectly sustainable, the lack of perfect integration in product markets means that the distribution of trade imbalances that is implied by a world of long-term creditors and debtors requires substantial movements in real exchange rates. As is shown by Milesi-Ferretti (2002a, 2004) , the magnitude of this transfer effect is quite sizeable and varies with degree of trade integration: the scale of the real exchange rate adjustment that is required to shift the trade balance of large, domestically-orientated country is much greater than for a small, highly-open economy. One implication is that the scale of exchange rate adjustment that is required in response to larger net international investment positions will depend on the extent and nature of real globalization in addition to the evolution of financial globalization.
This begs the question of the inter-relation between the different dimensions of economic
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See also Greenspan (2004) and Summers (2004) . At a regional level, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) show that there is increasing dispersion of current account balance among eurozone member countries.
globalization. As is emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) , a generalized reduction in trade costs will also promote financial globalization, since the gains to international portfolio diversification are enhanced by greater trade integration. 6 However, if trade integration leads to greater specialization in production, the scale of exchange rate adjustment that is required to reallocate global expenditure across countries may actually increase. 7 Reinforcing this point, it is plausible that international financial integration may actually promote specialization in trade patterns, since the risks inherent in specialized production may be partially diversified via global capital markets (Obstfeld 1994) . Along another dimension, if trade integration promotes international vertical integration in production and accelerates international technological diffusion, it is also the case that it may reduce asymmetries across countries and thereby weaken the incentives to run current account imbalances. In view of this complex set of relations between trade and financial integration, the joint study of these different dimensions of globalization is high at the top of the research agenda for international macroeconomists. See also Krugman (1990) , Lane (2001) and Heathcote and Perri (2004) .
8
This term was coined by Calvo (1998) in reference to capital account crises in emerging market economies. In fact, the ability of major financial centres such as the US and the UK to issue highly-liquid short-term liabilities means that they are particularly vulnerable to panic events. See also Kindleberger rapid closing of the US current account deficit. As is quantified by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 2004) , this would require a large exchange rate adjustment if a major recession is to be avoided. The magnitude of the US real exchange rate depreciation could exceed 50 percent, depending on the extent of nominal rigidities and the degree of pass through from exchange rates into consumer prices. Clearly, such a large relative price movement will be the more disruptive, the less flexible are firms and workers not only in the US but also in its major trading partners in Europe, Asia and Latin America.
Finally, as was pointed out earlier, it is important to appreciate that net foreign asset dynamics depend not only on current account flows but also on valuation effects. For instance, a country may run a current account deficit and yet still experience an improvement in its net international investment position if it enjoys sizeable capital gains on its foreign asset holdings and/or inflicts capital losses on its foreign liabilities. As is highlighted by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a) and Tille (2003) for the US, financial globalization increases the importance of the valuation channel by scaling up the gross size of international balance sheets: for instance, a 10 percent capital gain on foreign asset holdings represents a larger fraction of GDP, the larger is the ratio of gross foreign assets to output. In recent work, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004a) show that the valuation channel represents an additional mechanism by which exchange rates can play role in external adjustment, to the extent that the asset and liability sides of the international balance sheet are asymmetrically affected by a shift in the value of the exchange rate. Moreover, Gourinchas and Rey (2004) make the intriguing finding that such valuation movements have been stabilizing in the US case, with capital gains being timed to coincide with periods in which net foreign liabilities have grown too large. As a general rule, however, it is unlikely that such a channel is exploitable by policymakers, since investors would require a higher return if it is suspected that policymakers might try to confer a capital levy on foreign creditors.
(1965) and Murray and Smithers (2000) .
In this paper, I have emphasized that the pace of financial globalization has been impressive and is likely to continue. This is radically altering the global macroeconomic environment.
However, I have also suggested that behaviourial and informational barriers remain significant, such that we remain far from a idealized unified global capital market. In addition, the macroeconomic implications of financial globalization are quite sensitive to the extent of real globalization: substantial convergence has taken place between the research agendas of international trade economists and international macroeconomists.
Finally, I have reviewed the implications of financial globalization for external adjustment. With considerable fragmentation in product markets, the emergence of substantial non-zero net foreign asset positions implies large shifts in real exchange rates over time.
Moreover, financial panics cannot be ruled out if investors lose confidence in a major debtor nation: in such a situation, a reversal in capital flows will not only require even larger exchange rate movements but also, in the absence of sufficient flexibility, involve considerable dislocation in production levels across countries.
